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Abstract 
In process industries more and more decisions are “risk based”, such as equipment inspection, maintenance and management of 
change. Risk assessment is, in turn, based on the “Failure Rates”. For process plants, where Major Accident Hazard Legislation is 
enforced, even competent  authorities’ decisions, such as licensing and land use planning LUP, are “risk based” and, 
consequently, driven by Failure Rates. The Failure Rates currently in use for process equipment derive, basically from , a few 
large systematic studies conducted in the Sixties and Seventies on failure frequencies and modes. Many new materials, new 
production and management methods have been introduced and their effects on aging mechanisms on a large scale are still 
unknown. A few major multinational companies have proprietary failure databases, which are supposed to be up to date, both 
most companies, as well as Authorities, have to trust in public domain Failure Rates, which are poor and generic and could drive 
to questionable decisions. A few European Competent Authorities are trying to face the problem, by stating a set of trusted 
Failure Rates, suitable just for LUP. INAIL, as in charge for pressure equipment control throughout Italy, is gathering data for 
updating generic failure frequencies. The project is aiming to provide a sound knowledge base about pressure equipment failure 
rates and modes, in order to support the Risk Management by both industry and Authorities. 
© 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
Selection and peer-review under responsibility of ATI NAZIONALE. 
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1. Introduction 
In the process industries, such as oil, gas, petrochemical, chemical and power, reliability data include equipment 
failure modes and frequencies, which are essential to ensure system availability and production continuity. These 
data become even more important at the plants, where is applied the Seveso Directive for the control of Major 
Accident Hazard, which requires an integrated view of all safety related issues. In Seveso establishments, the 
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detailed knowledge of the equipment reliability is the keystones for and effective risk assessment and management. 
Failure rates, in particular, are essential for the probabilistic safety assessment, as required by Seveso Directive. 
Furthermore this data  is essential also to implement a risk based program of inspection and possibly of maintenance, 
aiming at optimizing safety, performances and costs. In chapter 1, both risk assessment and risk management are 
discussed, focusing the importance of the pressure equipment reliability. In chapter 2 the importance of failure rates 
for an efficient risk management is discussed. Chapter 3 discusses the efforts for providing trustable set of failure to 
the process industries. The fourth chapter presents preliminary results about a number of pressure equipment 
failures. The last chapter discusses the potential of an improved understanding of reliability matter for increase 
safety industries. 
 
2. Failure Rates and Risk Management in the common practice of process industries 
The Generic Failure Rates are derived by the statistical analysis of the failure frequency, as recorded in 
experimental campaigns. The scope of experimental campaigns may be sector based, national or international. 
Likelihood of failure LoF derives from Generic Failure Rates combined with specific factors. In this way, the Failure 
Rates are essential for risk assessment and management in any process industries. At Seveso establishments they are 
even more important, due to the specific legal duties. To avoid ambiguities the Directive 2012/18/EU (Seveso III) on 
the control of major-accident hazards at industrial establishment is referred. It will replace the previous Directive 
96/82/CE (Seveso II) in all European Union, before July 2015. 
2.1. Plants under “Seveso” Legislation 
According to the art. 10 of the Directive 2012/18/EU Seveso III operators of concerned establishments are 
required every five years to provide an up-to-date “Safety Report” to the Competent Authorities. From the 
assessment of the Safety Report descend important decisions, including the authorization of new plants, the 
prescription of plant modifications, the core of the safety report is a quantitative, or possibly, semi-quantitative 
analysis of risks, carried out by the operator, or rather by a few advisers and consultants. Given the importance of 
the decisions arising from the evaluation of the risk, it is important to analyze in detail the practice usually adopted. 
The common practice of the risk analysis has three steps:  
 
x 1) identification of the TOP-EVENTs (accidents with major consequences) by means of the HAZOP method;  
x 2) calculation, for each TOP-EVENT, of its occurrence probability, by means of Fault Three and Event tree 
analysis, FT/ETA, which are based on the reliability of the preventive and protective systems, derived, in turn, by 
the Failure Rates of the mechanical, hydraulic, electrical, electronic and possibly human and organizational 
systems, aiming at preventing or protecting from the release of hazardous materials;  
x 3) calculation, for each event with a significant probability, of the damage areas,  by means of physical models.  
scenarios with lethal, irreversible and reversible consequences are considered, as well as damages to property and 
environment and possibly domino effects. Consequences within or outside the establishment’s fences are 
discriminated. 
 
The probabilistic evaluations coupled with consequence modeling and potential impact area computation are 
essential for Authorities to make vital decisions about new plants approval, emergency planning (including resource 
allocation) and land use planning LUP. Also the identification of critical system within hazardous plants is driven by 
the failure rates, which, in such a way, affect also the safety management procedures. In a few countries, as France. 
Germany and Italy, the compatibility criteria rely more on the severity of the possible "consequences". The 
probability enters as a filter for the scenarios and related damage areas to be included (typically > 10-6). In other 
countries, such as Netherlands or UK, the decisions are driven by the calculation of the Societal Risk, which involve 
calculating the probability of casualties at a given exposure [1]. This calculation depend also on event probability, 
which in turn depend on Failure Rates. In both cases general failure rates drive decisions, but in the consequence 
based method the error propagation could be even higher than in Societal Risk approach, as likelihood becomes an 
1366   Paolo Pittiglio et al. /  Energy Procedia  45 ( 2014 )  1364 – 1371 
absolute filter. The scientific weakness of the generic failure frequencies have been discussed by a historical review 
of Fragola [2]. Authorities must anyway accept a trade-off to make standardized and uniform decisions. An 
inadequate value of a single Failure Rate value in the fault tree is able to affect vital decisions. Recent innovations 
are increasing component reliability but if the authorities accept arbitrary extrapolations of Failure Rates, could 
make imprudent decisions, excluding possible catastrophic events. A conservative approach is preferable for the 
Authorities’ decisions. The Buncefield incident has demonstrated the importance of an accurate assessment of the 
risk of involvement in the area of industrial accidents and the criticality of the general frequency of fault, for which 
the final report on the "lessons learned" complains a level of trust too low [3]. Following this report, an initial 
feasibility study on upgrading generic fault rate, aiming to improve the decision-making process was promoted by 
the British authorities [4].  
According to the art. 20 of the Seveso III Directive, the Competent Authorities organizes periodical Inspections 
at hazardous establishments. They must be sufficient for a planned and systematic examination of the systems being 
employed at the establishment, whether of a technical, organizational or managerial nature, so as to ensure in 
particular their adequateness to prevent (or mitigate) accident events. A way to make effective inspection, is to 
concentrate the efforts on the system, recognized as critical for accident prevention and protection. For technical 
system it is essential to trust in credible failures frequencies, to individuate the actual critical systems. 
2.2. Other plants (non Seveso) 
The potential of RBI Risk Based Inspection for optimizing Inspection planning at process plants has been widely 
discussed in many recent papers [5].  The basic idea of RBI is the optimization of inspection intervals, instead of 
fixed frequencies, required by traditional time based approach. In RBI, inspection times and modes are affected by 
an adequate assessment of failure risk, assumed as the combination of LoF and Severity of Consequences, as well as 
by the tolerable risk level and by the results of previous inspections.  To calculate the LoF, the generic Failure Rates 
are modified, according to the knowledge of the materials and of the operation condition. RBI is accepted in many 
European Countries also for planning mandatory equipment verifications. In Italy, for a few critical types of 
equipment, including fired and unfired pressure equipment, the inspection interval is fixed by law; but exceptions 
are possible, if the RBI implementation is demonstrated adequate to reduce the risk level lower than fixed periodical 
inspection. RBI is good for Seveso establishments, as the results of mandatory audits on human and organizational 
factors may be exploited to improve LoF, as demonstrated by Bragatto & al. [6]. Anyway RBI may be adequately 
applied at other process plants, where equipment availability and operation continuity are critical issues.  More 
generally speaking, using the ISO 31000 definitions, the risk management in a process establishment is aimed to 
understand and control uncertainties in the objective of a process plant, which is basically a profitable and safe 
production. Equipment failure is still a major uncertainty in a process plant and consequently efforts to develop 
knowledge about the frequency and the mode of equipment failures are worthwhile. For that reason a credible set of 
generic failure rates is essential to promote an efficient risk management even at small and medium sized process 
plants as discussed by Bragatto & al.  [7] 
3. “Failure Rates” in process industries: from the Seventies to the present 
As discussed in previous chapter, in all process industries the probabilistic assessment is essential for both risk 
assessment and risk management. At the very basis of the complex architecture there are always the failure rate, 
both for equipment, instruments and humans. The present paper focuses just mechanical failures on pressure 
equipment. For pressure vessels, it is less difficult to gather data, because almost all phases of their life-cycle are 
driven by national regulations. Instrument failures and human errors are equally important; but they are not subject 
to strict regulations and data collection is more difficult. The story of the Failure Rates for pressure equipment starts 
many years ago and it is essential to be understood, in order to identify the weakness of the present approach to 
define the road for an effective improvement. 
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3.1. The beginning 
Since the early 70’s a huge effort was made to provide the nuclear and chemical engineers with a credible set of 
reliability data of pressure vessels. In an article by Bush [8], the historical studies, conducted in previous decades at 
three major industrial countries, USA, UK and Germany, are reviewed and compared in a critical way. In the review 
eight national studies on pressure vessels are reported in detail. In each study, 10.000 to 100.000 pieces of 
equipment were observed for ten years and more. Those studies consider, as a whole, 3 million years-vessel (both 
fired and unfired) with some 8.600 minor faults and 155 major events. The average historical rates, as elaborated  by 
Bragatto & al. [9], are shown in table 1. 
Table 1 The average historical rates, coming from a few campaigns in the 60’s and 70’s. 
 minor  major failures  
Average F.R. (y-1) 3,9 10-4 2,6 10-5.  
Quad. dev.  18%  88% . 
 
In the early 80’s, the first scientific LUP studies were presented for the areas of Canvey Island UK  and Rijmond 
in NL [9-10]. The two studies proposed two sets of failure frequencies. Both failure rates sets have been derived 
from large historical datasets, handled by a number of experts, which customized them for process industries. 
Thereafter for many years, they was used trusted in Europe, due to the lack of alternatives. 
Since the 90s, two things occurred that completely changed the industry: quality management, which has been 
completely revolutionized by ISO 9000, and the management of the certification that has been completely 
revolutionized by the PED Directive. Furthermore, plants are aging more and more, due to  poor investments; the 
“new” materials, introduced in the 70’s and 80’s are not well known on a large scale. Also acceptance criteria for in-
service inspections are critical for ageing equipment. For all these reason, it’s essential to update the recognized 
national and international information sources for the failure rates, in particular for the pressure equipment. 
3.2.  Further European Experiences 
The quality of the data on equipment failures used in process industries should be updated to promote a more 
effective use in risk management, both for companies and authorities. As in most European countries, LUP 
decisions are based on event probability, for over a decade, there has been a commitment of the Competent 
Authorities to provide shared failure rates. The main sources are the following: 
 
x The “PURPLE BOOK” is a study ordered by the Dutch Competent Authority  to the TNO [1]. The values of 
frequencies are the result of discussions between representatives of the competent authorities and the 
government. The frequencies are often based on old data available at that time, in combination with expert 
judgment [12].  
x FRED (UK) is managed by HSE, the British Competent Authority [13]. The method is similar to that of the 
Purple Book, i.e. processing of consolidated data and expert judgment. The study, however, is more recent and 
the approach is much more conservative, thus the failure rates are systematically higher. 
x AMINAL (BE), the study AMINAL from Belgium is recent [14]. It is not far from the Purple Book, although 
data are presented in a different format. 
x American Petroleum Institute API (US) Even though it is a private body, API is highly influencing the Oil & Gas 
industry. The general failure rates are provided for many types of equipment, in the frame work of the resources 
to be used to implement a Risk Based Inspection (RBI) program [15]. 
  
A very recent HSE study [16] is trying an innovative path, to consider as a valuable information source the major 
accident records, which, by the Seveso Directive, must be reported to the Competent Authorities. The difficulty is 
figuring out which is the reference population, because there are no data on the total number of pipes and pressure 
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vessels at the Seveso establishments [17]. The proposal to exploit Google Earth is applicable just for external 
pipelines, not for establishments. Furthermore, only the catastrophic failures can be considered. The National 
Archives of fatalities could be a further source of data, but just faults with fatal consequences may be studied. That 
is misleading because there are many major failures with severe economic and environmental consequences, but 
without injuries.  
Large multinational companies are able to turn around the weakness of generic Failure Rates in public domain, as 
they control directly hundreds of plants, with thousands of pressure items, which may be a significant reference 
population for any statistical studies.  These Studies, unfortunately, are proprietary and cannot be found in the public 
domain and, consequently, they cannot be used neither by Authorities or minor companies.  
3.3. Recent efforts in Italy for updating Failure Rates 
The mandatory periodical inspections of pressure equipment could provide a valuable source of information. 
Public control body are able to follow all step in pressure equipment lifecycle, production, commissioning, 
periodical verifications, repairs, decommissioning and demolition. Unfortunately most information is scattered 
throughout the local agencies and the regional authorities. A decade ago, a pioneer  study was presented by the 
Region Emilia-Romagna, where the recorded anomalies were analyzed as verified by the public control body [18]. 
Featuring 46.000 pieces of equipment under observation and five years observation period, the study is significant 
indeed.  
Since 2012 INAIL has been in charge to organize a data base of the verification activities for working equipment, 
including fired and unfired pressure vessels and pressure piping. This is a good chance indeed to organize the 
knowledge about pressure equipment life cycles, defects, anomalies and failures. the analysis of the knowledge 
potential of data gathered in the verification activities throughout Italy, which are in charge of INAIL. As a first 
experiment pressure equipment failures have been investigated in a single Italian Province. The Varese area has 
been selected as pilot-province, as it is featuring a wide range of different industries, with some 7500 pressure 
equipment in service. There are also 28 Seveso plants. The Varese Local Health Agency provided their pressure 
equipment failure sheets from 2003 to now. For each recorded event an adequate set of detailed information has 
been provided, including photographs. A further source of information is the Italian Association of LPG, which is 
used to collect data about failures of small sized LPG tanks. Data are trusted by National Fire Brigade. Of course 
small LPG tanks are very simple, highly standardized and mostly used for domestic or similar purpose, thus they are 
much more reliable than complex equipment, used in stressed environment. 
3.4. More Knowledge is More Safety 
The pilot study based on failures recorded in Varese area has been exploited also to define a grid to gather useful 
data, in order to extract knowledge about the modes of failure and above all to understand how main factors 
influence the frequency of failure, including type of construction material, type of equipment (according to usual 
PED classification), operation parameters, type of company organizational models (e.g. Seveso). The grid is divided 
in section about establishment, equipment, event, damages and consequences. A good grid is essential for a first 
understanding, but a lot of knowledge may be hidden in free text event description, as well as in detail photographs. 
For this purpose the potential of advanced Knowledge Based KB techniques will be exploited to extract empirical 
rules useful to drive the risk management in process plants, as discussed by Bragatto & al. [9].     
4. Results 
The results of the first pilot Surveys are presented and discussed in the present chapter. 
4.1. Synopsis of “official” and “experimental” data 
The data gathered by Italian authorities and association, as described in § 3.3, has been processed to have a first 
appraisal of failure rates, as reported in table 1. 
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Table 2 Failure Rates derived by failure frequencies, as recorded by Authorities and association. 
LPG association 2002-12 Em.Rom. 1993-2003 ASL Varese 2003-13 
small 3,35 10-6 1,65 10-4 1,33 10-4 
large 6,70 10-7 5,28 10-5 6,67 10-5 
catastrofic 3,35 10-7 9,32 10-6 1,33 10-5 
equipment population 1,600,000 46,000 7,500 
  
It has to be stressed that values for Italy are original elaborations of the authors, which processed basic data 
provided by control bodies or associations. The derived values has been compared with “historical values”, as 
described in § 3.1 and with “official” European values, as described in §3.2.  Figure 1 shows a graph featuring the 
Failure Rates for pressure equipment derived by Bush[8]; the values used in  Canvey and Rijmond LUP studies , the 
values proposed by “official” or semi official sources (TNO, HSE, API, Aminal and, in the last three columns, the 
new Italian data. For uniformity of comparison were considered only failures with loss of containment. An attempt 
has be done to harmonize the discrimination of minor and major failures. In a few study it is based on the hole size, 
(e.g.< or > 10mm), whilst in other study the discrimination is based on repairability. The definition of “catastrophic” 
failure as it complete vessel destruction with consequent casualties, or severe damages for asset or environment. As 
catastrophic events are not so usual, in a few cases the available date are not statistically significant; in this case are 
shown in a lighter color. 
 
Fig. 1. The ”Italian” failure rates are shown in right columns*, compared to public domain and historical sources. 
4.2. Failure Modes 
The grid mentioned in 3.4 has been experimented to gather data coming from Varese area. The data are not enough 
to provide significant and trustable data, anyway the distribution of the failure according the PED category and the 
type of failure, as shown in figure 2, may give a feeling of the potential of gathered data. 
 
1,E-07 
1,E-06 
1,E-05 
1,E-04 
1,E-03 
small 
large 
catastrofic 
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Figure 2 failed pressure equipment in Varese area: (a) PED category (b) Causes 
4.3. Discussion 
Pressure equipment Failure rates as evaluated in Varese and Emilia-Romagna areas are a bit lower of historical 
values of the Seventies; thus is confirmed the real improvement of pressure equipment reliability in the last decades, 
even though lower than supposed.  
The experimental results are instead much higher than the “official” data proposed by Dutch and Flemish 
Authorities and even higher than API and  HSE values. It has to be stressed that both in Varese and in Emilia-
Romagna equipment in industrial and civil premises are not discriminated, whilst “official” and “historical” data are 
just for industrial sites, which have to be assumed more efficient in safety management. At the end API an HSE 
values, as quite conservative, are basically confirmed by experimental Italian data, whilst other data are too 
“optimistic” and inadequate for an application by Italian Authorities.  
The Failure rates for LPG are instead, very low indeed, but it is a niche sector, featuring a very good industrial 
association, an adequate safety culture and highly standardized operation, thus they should be considered a model to 
achieve for other industries.  
The very first results on failure modes confirm that  “technical” issues are still the main cause of equipment 
failure, even though about one third of the failure is due to some human and organizational issue. Furthermore in the 
highest PED category, the failure rate seems much higher; that is not so strange due the more severe condition of 
service. 
5. Conclusions 
The failure rates are the cornerstone of the risk management; but unfortunately in the process industries the 
“historical” values are obsolete and could be misleading. The systematic collection of data on pressure vessels 
subject to mandatory verification, is a great opportunity to increase knowledge on the matter. An updated set of 
general failure frequencies for risk assessment and decision making, is urgent. The structured grids to collect 
information from the field is suitable to organize the inspector practical experience, which, otherwise, would be 
isolated and useless. The failure rules, managed by means of advanced KB techniques will be exploited to promote 
sound risk management procedures throughout the Italian Process Industries.  At now the efforts are focused on 
pressure equipment, but in the future a similar road could be traced also for other type of equipment, such as lifting 
machines or atmospheric vessels.  
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